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Abstract
The paper studies properties of functional dependencies between strate-
gies of players in Nash equilibria of multi-player strategic games. The main
focus is on the properties of functional dependencies in the context of a
fixed dependency graph for pay-off functions. A logical system describing
properties of functional dependence for any given graph is proposed and
is proven to be complete.
1 Introduction
Functional Dependence. In this paper we study dependency between players’
strategies in Nash equilibria. For example, the coordination game described by
Table 1 has two Nash equilibria: (a1, b1) and (a2, b2). Knowing the strategy
of player a in a Nash equilibrium of this game, one can predict the strategy of
player b. We say that player a functionally determines player b and denote this
by aB b.
b1 b2
a1 1,1 0,0
a2 0,0 1,1
Table 1: Coordination Game
Note that in the case of the coordination
game, we also have b B a. However, for the
game described by Table 2 statement aB b is
true, but bB a is false.
The main focus of this paper is functional
dependence in multiplayer games. For exam-
ple, consider a “parity” game with three play-
ers a, b, c. Each of the players picks 0 or 1, and all players are rewarded if the
sum of all three numbers is even. This game has four different Nash equilibria:
(0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1), and (1, 1, 0). It is easy to see that knowledge of any
two players’ strategies in a Nash equilibrium reveals the third. Thus, using our
notation, for example a, bB c. At the same time, ¬(aB c).
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b1 b2
a1 1,1 0,0
a2 0,0 1,1
a3 1,1 0,0
Table 2: Strategic Game
As another example, consider a game be-
tween three players in which each player picks
0 or 1 and all players are rewarded if they
have chosen the same strategy. This game
has only two Nash equilibria: (0, 0, 0) and
(1, 1, 1). Thus, knowledge of the strategy of
player a in a Nash equilibrium reveals the
strategies of the two other players. We write
this as aB b, c.
Functional dependence as a relation has been studied previously, especially
in the context of database theory. Armstrong [1] presented the following sound
and complete axiomatization of this relation:
1. Reflexivity: ABB, if B ⊆ A,
2. Augmentation: ABB → A,C BB,C,
3. Transitivity: ABB → (B B C → AB C),
where here and everywhere below A,B denotes the union of sets A and B.
The above axioms are known in database literature as Armstrong’s axioms [5].
Beeri, Fagin, and Howard [2] suggested a variation of Armstrong’s axioms that
describe properties of multi-valued dependence.
Dependency Graphs. As a side result, we will show that the logical system
formed by the Armstrong axioms is sound and complete with respect to the
strategic game semantics. Our main result, however, is a sound and complete
axiomatic system for the relation B in games with a given dependency graph.
Dependency graphs [6, 7, 4, 3] put restrictions on the pay-off functions that
can be used in the game. For example, dependency graph Γ1 depicted in Fig-
ure 1, specifies that the pay-off function of player a only can depend on the
strategy of player b in addition to the strategy of player a himself. The pay-off
function for player b can only depend on the strategies of players a and c in
addition to the strategy of player b himself, etc.
a b c d
Figure 1: Dependency Graph Γ1
An example of a game over graph Γ1
is a game between players a, b, c, and d in
which these players choose real numbers
as their strategies. The pay-off function of
players a and d is the constant 0. Player
b is rewarded if his value is equal to the
mean of the values of players a and c. Player c is rewarded if his value is equal
to the mean of the values of players b and d. Thus, Nash equilibria of this game
are all quadruples (a, b, c, d) such that 2b = a+ c and 2c = b+ d. Hence, in this
game a, bB c, d and a, cB b, d, but ¬(aB b).
Note that although the statement a, b B c, d is true for the game described
above, it is not true for many other games with the same dependency graph Γ1.
In this paper we study properties of functional dependence that are common to
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all games with the same dependency graph. An example of such statement for
the graph Γ1, as we will show in Proposition 1, is aB d→ b, cB d.
Informally, this property is true for any game over graph Γ1 because any
dependencies between players a and d must be established through players b
and c. This intuitive approach, however, does not always lead to the right
conclusion. For example, in graph Γ2 depicted in Figure 2, players b and c also
separate players a and d. Thus, according to the same intuition, the statement
aB d→ b, cB d must also be true for any game over graph Γ2. This, however,
is not true. Consider, for example, a game in which all four players have three
strategies: rock, paper, and scissors. The pay-off function of players a and d
is the constant 0. If a and d pick the same strategy, then neither b nor c is
paid. If players a and d pick different strategies, then players b and c are paid
according to the rules of the standard rock-paper-scissors game. In this game
Nash equilibrium is only possible if a and d pick the same strategy. Hence,
a B d. At the same time, in any such equilibria b and c can have any possible
combination of values. Thus, ¬(b, cBd). Therefore, the statement aBd→ b, cBd
is not true for this game.
a b c d
Figure 2: Dependency Graph Γ2
As our final example, consider the
graph Γ3 depicted in Figure 3. We will
show that a B c → b B c is not true for
at least one game over graph Γ3. Indeed,
consider the game in which players a, b,
and c use real numbers as possible strate-
gies. Players a and c have a constant pay-
off of 0. The pay-off of the player b is
equal to 0 if players a and c choose the same real number. Otherwise, it is
equal to the number chosen by the player b himself. Note that in any Nash
equilibrium of this game, the strategies of players a and c are equal. Therefore,
aB c, but ¬(bB c).
a b c
Figure 3: Dependency Graph Γ3
The main result of this paper is a
sound and complete axiomatization of all
properties of functional dependence for
any given dependency graph. This result
is closely related to work by More and
Naumov on functional dependence of se-
crets over hypergraphs [8]. However, the logical system presented in this paper
is significantly different from theirs. A similar relation of “rational” functional
dependence without any connection to dependency graphs has been axiomatized
by Naumov and Nicholls [9].
The counterexample that we have constructed for the game in Figure 3 sig-
nificantly relies on the fact that player b has infinitely many strategies. However,
in this paper we show completeness with respect to the semantics of finite games,
making the result stronger.
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2 Syntax and Semantics
The graphs that we consider in this paper contain no loops, multiple edges, or
directed edges.
Definition 1 For any set of vertices U of a graph (V,E), border B(U) is the
set
{v ∈ U | (v, w) ∈ E for some w ∈ V \ U}.
A cut (U,W ) of a graph (V,E) is a partition U unionsq W of the set V . For any
vertex v in a graph, by Adj(v) we mean the set of all vertices adjacent to v. By
Adj+(v) we mean the set Adj(v) ∪ {v}.
Definition 2 For any graph Γ = (V,E), by Φ(Γ) we mean the minimal set of
formulas such that (i) ⊥ ∈ Φ(Γ), (ii) ABB ∈ Φ(Γ) for each A ⊆ V and B ⊆ V ,
(iii) φ→ ψ ∈ Φ(Γ) for each φ, ψ ∈ Φ(Γ).
Definition 3 By game over graph Γ = (V,E) we mean any strategic game
G = (V, {Sv}v∈V , {uv}v∈V ) such that (i) The finite set of players in the game
is the set of vertices V , (ii) The finite set of strategies Sv of any player v is an
arbitrary set, (iii) The pay-off function uv of any player v only depends on the
strategies of the players in Adj+(v).
By NE(G) we denote the set of all Nash equilibria in the game G. The next
definition is the core definition of this paper. The second item in the list below
gives a precise meaning of the functional dependence predicate ABB.
Definition 4 For any game G over graph Γ and any φ ∈ Φ(Γ), we define binary
relation G  φ as follows (i) G 2 ⊥, (ii) G  A B B if s =A t implies s =B t
for each s, t ∈ NE(G), (iii) G  ψ1 → ψ2 if G 2 ψ1 or G  ψ2, where here and
everywhere below 〈sv〉v∈V =X 〈tv〉v∈V means that sx = tx for each x ∈ X.
3 Axioms
The following is the set of axioms of our logical system. It consists of the original
Armstrong axioms and an additional Contiguity axiom that captures properties
of functional dependence specific to a given graph Γ.
1. Reflexivity: ABB, where B ⊆ A
2. Augmentation: ABB → A,C BB,C
3. Transitivity: ABB → (B B C → AB C)
4. Contiguity: A,BBC → B(U),B(W ), BBC, where (U,W ) is a cut of the
graph such that A ⊆ U and C ⊆W .
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Note that the Contiguity axiom, unlike the Gateway axiom [8], effectively re-
quires “double layer” divider B(U),B(W ) between sets A and C. This is because
in our setting values are assigned to the vertices and not to the edges of the
graph.
We write `Γ φ if φ ∈ Φ(Γ) is provable from the combination of the axioms
above and propositional tautologies in the language Φ(Γ) using the Modus Po-
nens inference rule. We write X `Γ φ if φ is provable using the additional set
of axioms X. We often omit the parameter Γ when its value is clear from the
context.
4 Examples
In this section we give examples of proofs in our formal system. The soundness
and the completeness of this system will be shown in the next two sections.
Proposition 1 `Γ1 aBd→ b, cBd, where Γ1 is the graph depicted in Figure 1.
Proof. Consider cut (U,W ) of the graph Γ1 such that U = {a, b} andW = {c, d}.
Thus, B(U) = {b} and B(W ) = {c}. Therefore, by the Contiguity axiom,
aB d→ b, cB d. 
Proposition 2 `Γ1 a, c B d → (d, b B a → b, c B a, d), where Γ1 is the graph
depicted in Figure 1.
Proof. Assume that a, cB d and d, bB a. Consider cut (U,W ) of the graph Γ1
such that U = {a, b} and W = {c, d}. Thus, B(U) = {b} and B(W ) = {c}.
Therefore, by the Contiguity axiom with A = {a}, B = {c}, and C = {d},
a, cB d→ b, cB d. Thus,
b, cB d. (1)
by the first assumption. Similarly, using the second assumption, b, cBa. Hence,
by the Augmentation axiom,
b, cB a, b, c. (2)
Thus, from statement (1) by the Augmentation axiom, a, b, c B a, d. Finally,
using statement (2) and the Transitivity axiom, b, cB a, d. 
Proposition 3 `Γ4 a, c B e → b, c, d B e, where Γ4 is the graph depicted in
Figure 4.
a b c d e
Figure 4: Dependency Graph Γ4
Proof. Consider cut (U,W ) of the graph
Γ4 such that U = {a, b, c} and W =
{d, e}. Thus, B(U) = {b, c} and B(W ) =
{d}. Therefore, a, cBe→ b, c, dBe by the
Contiguity axiom with A = {a}, B = {c},
and C = {e}. 
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Proposition 4 `Γ5 a B b → (b B c → (c B a → d, e, f B a, b, c)), where Γ5 is
depicted in Figure 5.
Proof. Assume aB b, bB c, and cBa. Consider cut (U,W ) of the graph Γ5 such
that U = {c, f} and W = {a, b, d, e}. Thus, B(U) = {f} and B(W ) = {d, e}.
Therefore, by the Contiguity axiom with A = {c}, B = ∅, and C = {a},
c B a → d, e, f B a. Hence, d, e, f B a by the third assumption. Similarly,
one can show d, e, f B b, and d, e, f B c. By applying the Augmentation axiom
to the last three statements, d, e, f B a, d, e, f, and a, d, e, f B a, b, d, e, f, and
a, b, d, e, f B a, b, c. Therefore, d, e, f B a, b, c by the Transitivity axiom applied
twice. 
c
f
d e
ba
Figure 5: Dependency Graph Γ5
Proposition 2 and Proposition 4 are
special cases of a more general principle.
We will say that a subset of vertices is
sparse if the shortest path between any
two vertices in this subset contains at
least three edges. The general principle
states that if W is a sparse subset of ver-
tices in the graph (V,E) and each vertex
w ∈ W is functionally determined by the
set V \ {w}, then the subset V \W func-
tionally determines the subset W :∧
w∈W
((V \ {w}))B w → (V \W )BW.
For example, the set {a, d} in the graph Γ1 depicted in Figure 1 is sparse. Due
to the general principle, a, b, cBd→ (d, c, bBa→ b, cBa, d). Thus, by Lemma 6,
a, c B d → (d, b B a → b, c B a, d), which is the statement of Proposition 2. In
the case of Proposition 4, the sparse set is {a, b, c}. The proof of the general
principle is similar to the proof of Proposition 4.
5 Soundness
We prove soundness of our logical system by proving soundness of each of our
four axioms separately.
Lemma 1 (reflexivity) G  ABB for each game G over a graph Γ = (V,E)
and each B ⊆ A ⊆ V .
Proof. For any s, t ∈ NE(G), if s =A t, then s =B t because A ⊆ B. 
Lemma 2 (augmentation) If G  A B B, then G  A,C B B,C for each
game G over a graph Γ = (V,E) and each A,B,C ⊆ V .
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Proof. Suppose that G  A B B and consider any s, t ∈ NE(G) such that
s =A,C t. We will show that s =B,C t. Indeed, s =A,C t implies that s =A t and
s =C t. Thus, s =B t by the assumption G  ABB. Therefore, s =B,C t. 
Lemma 3 (transitivity) If G  A B B and G  B B C, then G  A B C for
each game G over a graph Γ = (V,E) and each A,B,C ⊆ V .
Proof. Suppose that G  A B B and G  B B C. Consider any s, t ∈ NE(G)
such that s =A t. We will show that s =C t. Indeed, s =B t due to the first
assumption. Hence, by the second assumption, s =C t. 
Lemma 4 (contiguity) If G  A,B B C, then G  B(S),B(T ), B B C, for
each game G = (V,E) over a graph Γ, each cut (U,W ) of Γ, and each A ⊆ U ,
B ⊆ V , and C ⊆W .
Proof. Suppose that G  A,B B C. Consider any s = 〈sv〉v∈V ∈ NE(G) and
t = 〈tv〉v∈V ∈ NE(G) such that s =B(U),B(W ),B t. We will prove that s =C t.
Indeed, consider strategy profile e = 〈ev〉v∈V such that
ev =
{
sv if v ∈ U ,
tv if v ∈W.
We will first prove that e ∈ NE(G). Assuming the opposite, let v ∈ V be
a player in the game G that can increase his pay-off by changing strategy in
profile e. Without loss of generality, let v ∈ U . Then, e =Adj(v)∪{v} s. Thus,
player v can also increase his pay-off by changing strategy in profile s, which is
a contradiction with the choice of s ∈ NE(G).
Note that e =U,B s and e =W,B t. Thus, e =A,B s and e =C s. Hence,
e =C s by the assumption G  A,B B C. Therefore, s =C e =C t. 
6 Completeness
Lemma 5 B(X ∪ Y ) ⊆ B(X) ∪ B(Y ).
Proof. Let v ∈ B(X ∪ Y ). Thus, v ∈ X ∪ Y and there is w /∈ X ∪ Y such that
(v, w) ∈ E. Without loss of generality, assume that v ∈ X. Hence, v ∈ X and
w /∈ X. Therefore, v ∈ B(X). 
Lemma 6 ` AB C → A,B B C.
Proof. Assume ABC. By the Reflexivity axiom, A,B BA. Thus, by the Tran-
sitivity axiom, A,B B C. 
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Lemma 7 ` ABB,C → ABB.
Proof. Assume A B B,C. By the Reflexivity axiom, B,C B B. Thus, by the
Transitivity axiom, ABB. 
Theorem 1 For any graph Γ = (V,E) and any formula φ ∈ Φ(V ), if 0Γ φ, then
there must exist a game (V, {Sv}v∈V , {uv}v∈V ) over graph Γ such that G 2 φ.
Proof. Suppose that 0Γ φ. Let M be any maximal consistent subset of formulas
in Φ(Γ) such that ¬φ ∈M .
Definition 5 For any set of vertices A, let A∗ be the set {v ∈ V |M ` AB v}.
Theorem 2 A ⊆ A∗, for any A ⊆ V .
Proof. Let a ∈ A. By the Reflexivity axiom, ` AB a. Hence, a ∈ A∗. 
Lemma 8 M ` ABA∗, for any A ⊆ V .
Proof. Let A∗ = {a1, . . . , an}. By the definition of A∗, M ` A B ai, for any
i ≤ n. We will prove, by induction on k, that M ` (A B a1, . . . , ak) for any
0 ≤ k ≤ n.
Base Case: M ` AB∅ by the Reflexivity axiom.
Induction Step: Assume that M ` (A B a1, . . . , ak). By the Augmentation
axiom,
M ` A, ak+1 B a1, . . . , ak, ak+1. (3)
Recall that M ` A B ak+1. Again by the Augmentation axiom, M ` (A B
A, ak+1). Hence, M ` (A B a1, . . . , ak, ak+1), by (3) and the Transitivity ax-
iom. 
For any set of vertices A, we will now define strategic game
GA = (V, {Sv}v∈V , {uv}v∈V )
over graph Γ. For the purposes of this definition only, we assume that a direction
is assigned to each edge of the graph Γ in an arbitrary way.
Any player v ∈ A∗ may either choose strategy pass or opt to play “pennies”
with all of his adjacent players. In the latter case, he decides on either heads
or tails for each adjacent player. The player cannot choose to pass with one
player and to play pennies with others. Formally, if v ∈ A∗, then
Sv = {pass} ∪ {f | f : Adj(v)→ {heads, tails}}.
Similarly, any player v /∈ A∗ may either choose between strategies 0 and 1 or
decide to play pennies with all of his adjacent players. Thus, if v /∈ A∗, then
Sv = {0, 1} ∪ {f | f : Adj(v)→ {heads, tails}}.
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Furthermore, it will be assumed that any isolated (one that has no adjacent
vertices) vertex of the graph is prohibited from playing the pennies game. Thus
such vertices either have a single strategy pass or a set of just two strategies: 0
and 1.
We define the pay-off function of any player v as the sum of rewards in
individual pennies mini-games on the edges adjacent to v or a possible penalty
imposed on v for not playing the pennies.
Penalty. If there are u,w ∈ Adj+(v) \ A∗ such that u plays strategy 0 and w
plays strategy 1, then a penalty in the amount of 1 is imposed on v unless v
plays pennies.
0
1
pass
u v
x
ta
ils
ta
ils
heads
tai
ls
y
w
Figure 6: Strategy Profile
For example, consider the strategy
profile depicted in Figure 6. We will as-
sume that elements of A∗ are the shaded
vertices. Vertices w, x, and y are sub-
ject to the penalty because player x plays
0 and player y plays 1. Players u and v
have chosen to play pennies, and thus are
not subject to any penalties.
Rewards. In an individual mini-game
along any edge of the graph Γ, rewards
are only given if both players are playing
pennies. The rewards are given according to the rules of a variation of the stan-
dard Matching Pennies game: the player who is, say, at the beginning of the
directed edge is rewarded 1 for matching his opponent’s strategy and the player
at the opposite end of the edge is rewarded 1 for not matching his opponent’s
strategy.
For example, in the strategy profile depicted in Figure 6, player u gets the
reward 1 for matching player v. Player v is not rewarded. Players x, y, and w
also do not receive any rewards since they are not playing pennies.
This concludes the definition of the game GA.
Lemma 9 In any Nash equilibrium of the game GA, no player is playing the
pennies game.
Proof. Assume that a vertex v is playing pennies games in a strategy profile s.
Due to the definition of the set of strategies in the game GA, vertex v can not be
an isolated vertex in the graph Γ. Let u be any vertex adjacent to v. If player u
is not playing pennies in s, then he can increase his pay-off by playing pennies.
If player u is playing pennies in s, then either player u or player v would want
to switch his strategy in the mini-game along edge (u, v) since the two-player
Matching Pennies game has no Nash equilibria. Therefore, strategy profile s is
not a Nash equilibrium. 
Lemma 10 sw1 = sw2 for each w1, w2 ∈ Adj+(v) \ A∗, each v ∈ V , and each
s = 〈sw〉w∈V ∈ NE(GA).
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Proof. By Lemma 9, no player is playing pennies in profile s. Suppose that
sw1 6= sw2 for some w1, w2 ∈ Adj+(v) \A∗. Thus, player v is subject to penalty
in the strategy profile s. Then, he can increase his pay-off by starting to play
pennies and avoiding the penalty. Therefore, s /∈ NE(GA). 
Definition 6 For any u, v ∈ V , let u ∼ v if there is a path from u to v in graph
Γ such that no two consecutive vertices of the path belong to the set A∗.
Lemma 11 Relation ∼ is an equivalence relation on the set V . 
By [v] we will denote the equivalence class of vertex v with respect to this
relation.
Lemma 12 If u ∼ v, then su = sv, for each u, v /∈ A∗ and each 〈sw〉w∈V ∈
NE(GA).
Proof. Let pi = (w0, w1, . . . , wk) be a path connecting vertices u and v (w0 = u
and wk = v) such that no two consecutive vertices in pi belong to A
∗. We prove
the statement by induction on k. If k = 0 then u = v. Thus, su = sv. Suppose
now that k > 0.
Case I: w1 /∈ A∗. Thus, by Lemma 10, su = sw1 . By the Induction Hypothesis,
sw1 = sv. Therefore, su = sv.
Case II: w1 ∈ A∗. Thus, w1 6= v and, since no two consecutive vertices in pi
belong to A∗, we have w2 /∈ A∗. Hence, su = sw2 by Lemma 10 and sw2 = sv
by the Induction Hypothesis. Therefore, su = sv. 
Lemma 13 B([v]) ⊆ A∗ for each v ∈ V .
Proof. Let w ∈ B([v]), but w /∈ A∗. By Definition 1, there is u /∈ [v] such that
(w, u) ∈ E. Consider the two-vertex path pi = (w, u). Since w /∈ A∗, no two
consecutive vertices in pi belong to A∗. Hence, w ∼ u. Note that v ∼ w by
Definition 1. Thus, v ∼ u, which is a contradiction. 
Lemma 14 If C BD ∈M , then GA  C BD.
Proof. Let s = 〈sv〉v∈V , s′ = 〈s′v〉v∈V ∈ NE(GA) such that s =C s′. It will be
sufficient to show that sd = s
′
d for each d ∈ D. Consider any d ∈ D. If d ∈ A∗,
then player d has only two options in the game GA: to play pennies or to decide
to pass. By Lemma 9, player d chooses the strategy pass under strategy profiles
s and s′. Therefore, sd = s′d. We will now assume that d /∈ A∗.
If d ∼ c0 for some c0 ∈ C \ A∗, then, by Lemma 12, sd = sc0 = s′c0 = s′d.
We will now assume that d  c for each c ∈ C \ A∗. Thus, C \ A∗ ⊆ ⋃v/∈[d][v].
Consider cut (
⋃
v/∈[d][v], [d]). By the Contiguity axiom,
C \A∗, A∗ B d→ B(
⋃
v/∈[d]
[v]),B([d]), A∗ B d
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Due to the assumption M ` C BD and Lemma 6 and Lemma 7,
M ` C \A∗, A∗ B d
Thus,
M ` B(
⋃
v/∈[d]
[v]),B([d]), A∗ B d
By Lemma 5, B(⋃v/∈[d][v]) ⊆ ⋃v/∈[d] B([v]) Hence, by Lemma 6,
M `
⋃
v/∈[d]
B([v]),B([d]), A∗ B d
Then, by Lemma 13, M ` A∗ B d. Thus, by Lemma 8 and the Transitivity
axiom, M ` AB d. Therefore, d ∈ A∗, which is a contradiction. 
Definition 7 For any A ⊆ V and any k ∈ {0, 1}, let strategy profile sk,A be
defined as
sk,Av =
{
pass if v ∈ A∗,
k otherwise.
Lemma 15 sk,A ∈ NE(GA) for each k ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof. By the definition of the game GA, no player is paying a penalty in the
strategy profile sk,A. At the same time, no player can get a reward by unilater-
ally switching to playing pennies. 
Lemma 16 If GA  AB b, then b ∈ A∗.
Proof. Assume that b /∈ A∗. By Lemma 2, s0,A =A s1,A. At the same time,
s0,Ab = 0 6= 1 = s1,Ab since b /∈ A∗. Therefore, GA 2 AB b. 
The product construction below defines a way to combine several games
played over the same graph into a single game. The pay-off for a given player
in the combined game is the sum of his pay-offs in the individual games.
Definition 8 Let Gi = (V, {Siv}v∈V , {uiv}v∈V ) for i ∈ I be any family of games
over the same graph Γ = (V,E). By
∏
i∈I G
i we mean game (V, {Sv}v∈V , {uv}v∈V )
such that
1. Sv is the Cartesian product
∏
i∈I S
i
v,
2. uv =
∑
i∈I u
i
p.
Lemma 17 If 〈〈siv〉i∈I〉v∈V ∈ NE(
∏
i∈I G
i), then 〈si0v 〉v∈V ∈ NE(Gi0) for
each i0 ∈ I. 
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Lemma 18 If 〈siv〉v∈V ∈ NE(Gi) for each i ∈ I, then
〈〈siv〉i∈I〉v∈V ∈ NE(
∏
i∈I
Gi).

Lemma 19 If {Gi}i∈I is a family of games over a graph Γ such that each of
these games has a nonempty set of Nash equilibria, then
∏
i∈I G
i  C B D if
and only if for each i ∈ I, Gi  C BD.
Proof. (⇒) : Assume that si0 = 〈si0v 〉v∈V ∈ NE(Gi0) and ti0 = 〈ti0v 〉v∈V ∈
NE(Gi0) are such that si0 =C t
i0 . We will show that si0 =D t
i0 .
By the assumption of the lemma, for each i ∈ I, the game Gi has at least one
Nash equilibria. We denote an arbitrary one of them by ei = 〈eiv〉v∈V . Consider
strategy profiles S = 〈〈siv〉i∈I〉v∈V and T = 〈〈tiv〉i∈I〉v∈V for the game
∏
i∈I G
i
such that
siv =
{
si0v if i = i0,
eiv otherwise.
tiv =
{
ti0v if i = i0,
eiv otherwise.
By Lemma 18, we have S,T ∈ NE(∏i∈I Gi). Note that S =C T due to the
assumption si0 =C t
i0 . Hence, S =D T by the assumption of the lemma.
Therefore, si0 =D t
i0 .
(⇐) : Consider Nash equilibria S = 〈〈siv〉i∈I〉v∈V and T = 〈〈tiv〉i∈I〉v∈V of the
game
∏
i∈I G
i such that S =C T. We will show that S =D T. It will be sufficient
to show that 〈siv〉v∈V =D 〈tiv〉v∈V for each i ∈ I. Indeed, 〈siv〉v∈V =C 〈tiv〉v∈V
due to the assumption S =C T. By Lemma 17, 〈siv〉v∈V , 〈tiv〉v∈V ∈ NE(Gi).
Therefore, 〈siv〉v∈V =D 〈tiv〉v∈V by the assumption of the lemma. 
Lemma 20 For any ψ ∈ Φ(Γ), ψ ∈M if and only if ∏A⊆V GA  ψ.
Proof. Induction on the structural complexity of formula ψ. The case ψ ≡ ⊥
follows from the assumption of consistency of the set M and Definition 4. The
case ψ ≡ ψ1 → ψ2 follows from maximality and consistency of the set M and
Definition 4 in the standard way. Assume now that ψ ≡ E B F .
If E B F ∈ M , then, by Lemma 14, GA  E B F for each A ⊆ V . By
Lemma 15, each of the games GA has at least one Nash equilibria: s
0,A. There-
fore,
∏
A⊆V GA  E B F by Lemma 19.
If
∏
A⊆V GA  E B F , then by Lemma 19, GE  E B F . Hence, by Defi-
nition 4, GE  E B f for each f ∈ F . Hence, by Lemma 16, f ∈ E∗ for each
f ∈ F . Thus, F ⊆ E∗. Note that M ` EBE∗ by Lemma 8. Hence, M ` EBF
by Lemma 7. Therefore, E B F ∈M due to maximality of M . 
To finish the proof of the theorem, recall that ¬φ ∈ M . Thus, φ /∈ M due
to consistency of M . Therefore, by Lemma 20,
∏
A⊆V GA 2 φ. 
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have described a sound and complete logical system for func-
tional dependence in strategic games over a fixed dependency graph. The de-
pendency graph puts restrictions on the type of pay-off functions that can be
used in the game. If no such restrictions are imposed, then the logical system for
functional dependence in strategic games is just the set of original Armstrong
axioms. This statement follows from our results since the absence of restrictions
corresponds to the case of a complete (in the graph theory sense) dependency
graph. In the case of a complete graph, the Contiguity axiom follows from the
Armstrong axioms because for any cut (U,W ), the set B(U) ∪ B(W ) is the set
of all vertices in the graph.
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